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Property and Planning Law in England: facilitating and countering gentrification1  
 
“The rent of land, it may be thought, is frequently no more than a reasonable profit or 
interest for the stock laid out by the landlord upon its improvement… When the lease 
comes to be renewed, however, the landlord commonly demands the same augmentation 
of rent as if they had been all made by his own.” Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Chapter 11, Of the Rent of Land, 1776, 02. 
 
“… every letting agent should spare a kind thought for the memory of Margaret Thatcher - 




At the heart of gentrification is change. This includes the alteration of physical buildings; the 
emergence of new bars; the loss of established shops or community and social centres. It 
entails alterations in types of people who live in a neighbourhood, sometimes understood in 
terms of class or race and ethnicity, as well as in terms of appetites, preferences and social 
practices. Gentrification includes shifts in transportation systems, the introduction of 
private buses or cycling lanes. Gentrified locations are perceived as “improved”, and, 
perhaps “less authentic”. As Glass famously wrote: “[o]nce this process of “gentrification” 
starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers 
are displaced and the social character of the district is changed” (Glass, 1964 (1989), 139). 
And as Smith noted thirty years later: “Gentrification is no longer about a narrow and 
quixotic oddity in the housing market but has become the leading residential edge of a 
much larger endeavour: the class remake of the central urban landscape” (Smith, 1996, 39). 
Gentrification is about place and networks (of people, capital and cultures) and the 
relationships between the two.  
 
The causes of these changes are, of course, contested (production, consumption or – 
probably – both [Lees et al, 2008]). Gentrification is produced by private actors but often in 
collaboration with public-private partnerships facilitating private development on public 
land both in residential contexts (including the “regeneration” of council estates or retail-led 
urban regeneration). Networked effects, including tourism, university expansion, use of 
sexually orientated businesses or changes in the night-time economy, all bring “outsiders” 
into gentrifying areas. There are continued arguments about whether these changes are 
                                                      
1 This draft chapter has benefitted greatly from insightful comments by Loretta Lees, David 
Cowan and Ed Burtonshaw-Gunn.  
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positive, improving urban landscapes and local cultural offers, or negative, displacing long-
standing residents in favour of wealthier, more articulate, privileged incomers.  
 
All of these aspects of gentrification are legally co-produced. In particular, gentrification is 
produced by planning and property laws, specific to each jurisdiction, coupled with 
practices, implementation and priorities of landowners. Gentrification decisions are co-
produced by legal geography – the interaction of the social, the spatial and the legal 
(Blomley 2004, Bennett and Layard, 2016). This is often observable in case studies, tracking 
change (including, Blomley 2004, Hodkinson and Essen, 2015; Hubbard et al, 2009) as well 
as in the interaction of historical legacies, “ghost jurisdictions” (Valverde, 2012; Freeman, 
2017). Each legal framework, however, is jurisdiction-specific.  
 
This chapter analyses both English residential and commercial legal provisions, which do not 
apply everywhere within the United Kingdom, let alone beyond. However, in explaining how 
gentrification can be facilitated by property and planning rules in England, we can identify 
where other researchers should look for legal rules and practices, overlaps and differences. 
Who owns property? What is the nature of that ownership (freehold, leasehold or a 
licence?) Is there security of tenure (can tenants – whether commercial or residential – 
choose to stay as long as they like?)? Are there restrictions on how or when rents can be 
raised? In new housing developments, who decides how much of the accommodation will 
be affordable (and what does affordable mean?). These questions and legal details matter in 
gentrification studies. The more international collaborative projects investigate these 
questions, the better. With more legally inflected gentrification scholarship, we can 
understand how doctrinal provisions and legal practices facilitate change, as well as how 
jurisdictions might learn from each other to develop alternative provisions that could inhibit 
or slow down unwanted change. 
 
(1) Residential Property 
 
Much has been written on residential displacement in gentrification including the vexed 
discussions of production and consumption and who or what gentrifiers are (Lees et al, 
2008). One of the key markers of early gentrification by new residents in neighbourhoods 
has been the switch between leasehold and freehold, producing a teneurial transformation 
(Lees, 1994). As Glass described it in Aspects of Change: “One by one, many of the working-
class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes – upper and lower. 
Shabby, modest mews and cottages – two rooms up and two down – have been taken over, 
when their leases have expired, and have become elegant expensive residences” (1989, 
138). Tenants were replaced by owner occupiers in 1960s London and if, as Slater (2006) 
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argues, we should focus on displacement “from below”, one way to do this is to understand 
how existing residents are evicted and how new residents are able to move into the locality 
in their place. Blomley’s (2004) study of gentrification in Vancouver, for example, begins 
with the example of the Hotel California, where low income renters were evicted to make 
way for a more profitable hotel.  
 
To explain how similar evictions, and a lack of security of tenure, exist in England as well, it 
is important to understand the distinction between freehold and leasehold property that is 
enshrined into English land law (section 1 of the Law of Property Act, 1925). Since 1925, the 
historically complex legal systems for governing property use and entitlement in England 
have been hugely simplified. As a result, while there are sophisticated debates about what 
property “is” or should be (a bundle of rights, a numerus clausus (an irreducible core), 
informative, progressive or facilitative (for an overview, see Baron, 2010, Davies, 2007)), the 
legal position about what rights of land law consist of in England is clearly prescribed. 
Landownership is either freehold or leasehold (there is no native title in England). The 
estate is not allodial (it does not consist of the soil itself); instead it is a metaphor for time 
(Gray and Gray, 2003). A freehold estate has no time limit. A leasehold estate is ownership 
of land with a time limit and it is subject to such conditions as the freeholder may impose in 
the lease (as well as statutory and common law provisions). While critics have argued that 
property should be different – encompassing “a relational web of obligations, connections” 
(Blomley, 1997, 293) – the legally enshrined, dominant conception of property in England 
has remained largely immutable to such normative concerns.  
 
While this legislative distinction between freehold and leasehold broadly explains the 
difference between owners and renters, there is no time limit to a lease in England and 
leases of up to 999 years are not uncommon and are often assumed to be equivalent to 
freehold (even though legally this is not the case). In England there is no equivalent to 
Australian strata title or Canadian condominiums and while “commonhold” property is 
legally provided for (Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act, 2002), this more collaborative 
property form has so far not taken off. Instead, both freeholders and long leaseholders are 
presumed to be owners of their estate, with similar powers to exclude. However, even with 
long leases, if no action is taken and no premium paid, the land “reverts” to the freeholder 
at the end of the leaseholders’ term (see generally, Gray and Gray, 2011, Cowan, 2011).  
 
These two legal devices – freehold and leasehold – provide extraordinary security for one 
landowner (the freeholder) and possible vulnerability for another (the leaseholder), 
particularly in the case of private sector short leases (also known as tenancies). This 
vulnerability is of course a political choice. Jurisdictions where rent stabilisation and security 
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of tenure is possible (notably in Germany, Austria and in cities including New York and 
Berlin) have made different legal and political choices (for Germany, see Urban, 2015 and, 
for a critique, see Deschermeier et al, 2016). These distinctive legal frameworks mean that a 
“German lease” is quite different from an “English lease”. Similarly, a “social lease” in 
England is quite different from an assured shorthold tenancy (the default in the private 
sector) as this chapter will explain. Of course, an English landowner may agree a low rent 
with security of tenure with a tenant but there is no legal requirement that they do so. 
Similarly, rental terms are through practice – not legislation – generally for one year. In the 
absence of any “ethical landlordism”, legally implemented, political choices to regulate 
landlords lightly in England apply to leases. These rules are one reason for the housing 
market we have today. 
 
Beginning then with private tenants – the most vulnerable residents – we need to turn to 
the 1988 Housing Act. This marked a turning point in English housing law for tenants in the 
private sector and it is the reason that Margaret Thatcher is thanked, on behalf of estate 
agents, at the head of the chapter. In particular, the 1988 Housing Act made two crucial 
alterations. First, it effectively abolished rent control for all new tenants. Broadly, rent 
control had been in place until 1965, while rent regulation existed from 1965 to 1988. From 
now on tenants would have to pay the market rent. If tenants could not afford this open 
market rent, they could apply for housing benefit to subsidise their occupation so that the 
landlord received the full market rent if landlords would rent to people in receipt of benefit 
(no DSS signs in windows or in instructions to letting agents became common devices) (see 
generally, Cowan 2011, White and Lees, 2015). These costs are extraordinarily high. In 2014-
15, around £27 billion was spent on housing benefit (ONS, 2016), with a broadly even split 
between local authority, housing association and private landlords receiving around 25%, 
38% and 37% respectively (House of Commons Library, 2016a).  
Second, the 1988 Act changed the rules on security of tenure so that landlords could grant 
either assured or assured shorthold tenancies. The assured shorthold tenancy (ASTs) 
became incredibly popular, and indeed the legal default in 1997 (after changes introduced 
by the 1996 Housing Act). An assured shorthold tenancy must be for a minimum of six 
months but after that time, the landlord can recover the property at the end of the term 
(conventionally, through estate agent and landlord practice, a year, although there is no 
legal maximum). The landlord can also recover the property for a variety of other grounds, 
including non-payment of rent for two months (Schedule 2, Housing Act 1988 as amended). 
Any tenancies from before the date the 1988 Act came into force (in 1989) continued but all 
new tenants (unless they were on very low or very high rents or lived with their landlord), 
had far more precarious tenancies with the introduction of assured shortholds. While in 
2014, the Government issued a model tenancy agreement with a three-year term, they 
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noted that “there is no legal requirement to use this particular agreement” (DCLG, 2014, 5). 
Similarly, in the 2017 Housing White Paper, the Government have proposed to “make the 
private rented sector more family-friendly by taking steps to promote longer tenancies on 
new build rental homes” (DCLG, 2017a, para 4.35) but there is nothing legally binding here. 
 
These two changes: a lack of restrictions on rent and almost no security of tenure have been 
crucial to processes of gentrification in England. By far the most common private sector 
tenancy type today is an assured shorthold and in England in 2015-16 the private rented 
sector accounted for 4.5 million or 20% of households. This was up from approximately 10% 
of households throughout the 1980s and 1990s with the sector doubling in size from around 
2002 and continuing to grow (DCLG, 2017b).  
 
This matters for gentrification since, with no security of tenure for renters, and with no 
ability to “remov[e] oneself from the vagaries of the private real estate market” (DeVerteuil, 
2015), private tenants are at the mercy of landlords’ decisions at the end of the lease. The 
quality of these living spaces is also often poor. The English Housing Survey found 28% of 
privately rented homes were “non-decent” in 2015-6, far more than socially rented or 
owner occupied homes (DCLG, 2017b). And even when legal protections are enshrined (for 
example, the protections against retaliatory eviction in the 2015 Retaliatory Eviction and 
Deregulation Act), they are difficult to implement given the power dynamic between 
landlord and tenant. Specifically, in a gentrification context, it means that private sector 
tenants cannot resist eviction for very long if higher payers and more desirable tenants 
(however perceived) can be found. Recent research also indicates that it is, once again, 
increasingly widespread for landlords to refuse to let to tenants in receipt of housing benefit 
(which subsidises their rent) and that this is unlikely to amount to direct discrimination, 
since income and employment status are not protected characteristics under the Equality 
Act 2010 (House of Commons Library, 2016b).  
This rental turnover is a new form of gentrification in England, since new tenants are quite 
different from first wave middle-class gentrifiers, buying the freeholds of their properties 
and becoming (landed) gentry (acquiring “some version of the aristocratic country house” 
(Glass, 1989, 153)). Freeholders (and long leaseholders) have some protection against 
neighbourhood change. Private renters do not (however much they are paying). While in 
the United States, homeowners may pay increased property taxes in gentrified 
neighbourhoods (Smith and Williams, 2013) the opposite is true in England. Here, as council 
tax is based on local need, higher taxes are collected in poorer and older localities so that 
although council tax is constructed to be financially progressive, it is spatially regressive. For 
example, average Band D council tax in Westminster in central London is £680 a year, while 
in the North East of England the average is 1636 a year (HofC, 2016c). And even in the 
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United States, with property taxes, there is evidence that gentrification hurts renters far 
more than homeowners (Martin and Beck, 2016).  
The question then, is whether this rental insecurity, which is highlighted in gentrification 
studies, is particularly unusual. An alternative suggestion is that these inequities, as we see 
them, are a standard incident of the lease. This inability to stay put is an expression of 
housing precarity more generally, particularly in the private sector. The Housing Act 1988 
applies to all locations. Rental “churn” affects many locations, gentrifying or not, as 
Matthew Desmond’s (2016) Evicted, set in the United States, so brilliantly illustrates. Indeed 
there is some suggestion that residential (leasehold) displacement is not exacerbated in 
gentrifying neighbourhoods (for American analyses, see Freeman 2005, 2015 and Kleinhans 
and Kearns, 2013). Whether or not gentrification causes residential displacement, it is clear 
that rental insecurity is an ongoing concern, in many, many locations, frequently invisible to 
those in more secure housing settings.   
 
In order to stop residential displacement whether as a consequence of gentrification or 
more generally, we might do one of two things. One option is to address the instruments 
that facilitate it, particularly the lease as constructed under the 1988 Housing Act. This 
would mean arguing for the introduction of some form of rent stabilisation in the private 
sector, so that rents are not determined by market forces alone. While public opinion in 
England appears increasingly to favour some form of rent control (Survation, 2014), Labour 
leaders, including Ed Milliband and Jeremy Corbyn, have been summarily critiqued for such 
suggestions (“with references to Venezuelan-style rent controls” quickly taken up by the 
press (The Telegraph, 2014). Rent regulation is not on the political agenda in England. 
 
Some local authorities who have experienced resident change have attempted to go alone. 
Camden, in London, for example, commissioned research on rent stabilisation in 2014 and 
argued that “Camden should positively enable longer-term tenancies with index-linked rent 
increases, voluntarily agreed by landlord and tenant, while at the same time improving 
transparency and contractual enforcement for both landlords and tenants across the 
sector” (Scanlon and Whitehead, 2014, 6). However, unlike in Berlin or New York were cities 
have constitutional powers to introduce restrictions on the rental market, in England rents 
are regulated nationally and local authorities do not have the constitutional powers to 
create their own land law rules. There is no constitutional basis for localised rent regulation. 
 
Nevertheless, this idea of voluntary “ethical renting” within the private sector can build on 
the understanding that leases are instruments that are only very lightly regulated and that 
as contracts as well as estates in land, landlords and tenants can agree their own terms. In 
the vast majority of private rental sector leases this will be a standard 12-month lease on 
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relatively standard forms provided (for a fee) by estate agents or conveyancing solicitors. It 
may be possible to change the motivations of landlords (generally by changing who the 
landlords are) and landlords can of course introduce use the 3 year model tenancy for a 
“reasonable” rent. This is their choice. A difference in practice is most obvious in the leases 
granted by (social) housing associations or local authorities (for council tenants) considered 
below. Any private landlord could also, however, grant a progressive (secure and for low 
rent) lease (although often this would mean that letting agent practices would have to 
become “ethical” as well). 
 
This is a particular possibility if community groups can buy property when prices are still 
(relatively) low. One such example is in Hastings, where Rock Neighbourhood Ventures 
(WRNV) have bought Rock House in the White Rock area of Hastings to develop it as a ‘co-
habitation’ space – co-housing, co-working, collaborative creative space. This is an explicit 
move: as Jess Steele, Director of White Rock Neighbourhood Ventures, asks on the website: 
“How can we capture the benefits of gentrification and control the downsides?” (Steele, 
2014). Greater use of ethical leases, cooperative ventures or community land trusts, all offer 
the ability to provide long term housing security and so inhibit change and housing precarity 
(in DeVerteuil’s (2015) term they can provide “spatial resilience”). These are further tools, if, 
and this is a big if, the difficulties with land acquisition, finance and assumptions about 
expertise can be resolved (Field and Layard, 2016). If ownership can change to more benign 
freeholders, given a landowner’s ability to set the agenda for the site, institutional 
resistance to gentrification can then take place.  
 
What then of social housing? For local authority and housing association homes, different 
rules and practices apply. Although the leasehold mechanism is essentially the same 
(created still under s1 of the 1925 legislation), there are different forms of tenancies, 
including secure, introductory or flexible for local authority housing and secure, assured or 
starter tenancies in housing associations. There has been enormous political interference 
and new legislation in this field, so that social housing is for many seen as an “ambulance 
service” rather than providing secure, affordable housing for life (Fitzpatrick and Pawson, 
2012). The greatest change has been the shift from council housing to housing association 
provision through the “arms-length management” reforms, begun in the 1980s and the 
creation of the social housing sector where different rules can apply (Cowan and 
McDermont, 2006). This has been a field of extraordinary change, most recently in the 2016 
Housing and Planning Act. Social landlords are continually at odds – both with the 
Government and with each other – over “who and what English social housing is for” 
(Fitzpatrick and Watts, 2016). Where they exist, however, secure tenancies remain by far 
the most protective tenancies and also generally include the right to buy (with generous 
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discounts, facilitated particularly by Thatcher’s 1980 Housing Act for tenants of local 
authorities and the Housing and Planning Act 2016 for tenants of Housing Associations). The 
most recent estimates, in 2015-16, found that 17% (3.9 million) of households lived in the 
social rented sector, compared with 20% (4.5 million) of households who were renting 
privately (DCLG, 2017b).  
 
These numbers are, however, going down, largely as a consequence of the right to buy, 
reducing from 31% of households in the social sector in 1980 to 19% in 2000 (DCLG, 2016a). 
The primary reason for this reduction lies in right to buy discounts, the liberalisation of 
mortgage lending in the 1980s and introduction of “buy-to-let” mortgages in the late 1990s 
(Crook and Kemp, 2011). With these developments, many private landlords bought council 
housing and former tenants often made substantial windfall profits. Estimates now suggest 
that between 30-40% of previously council owned properties are rented by private 
landlords (Murie 2016, 107) with many receiving housing benefit to subsidise the rent to 
market levels. This has significantly benefitted estate agents, as Martin & Co (2016) point 
out in their tribute to Margaret Thatcher: “All of this ex-council stock is now traded to the 
benefit of estate agents fees”. In practice, the right to buy has led to less stability and more 
rental churn, given private rental rules and practices, again facilitating gentrification. The 
English experience here echoes that in other jurisdictions as well, for example Sweden 
(Andersson and Turner, 2014)). 
 
Moreover, even within the much more stable and protective social housing sector that 
remains, there has been a growing concern in recent years about residential insecurity. Here 
“state-induced” or “state produced” gentrification (Lees et al, 2008, Watt, 2009, Hodkinson 
and Essen, 2015), has seen the regeneration of estates particularly in London. Often framed 
in the policy context of “social mix” (Bridge et al, 2012), these initiatives have produced 
significant change both in material surroundings and in the identity of residents. For some 
time these sites of social housing – council owned housing estates – were barriers to 
gentrification (Butler and Robson, 2003). However, with limited local authority budgets and 
fantastically valuable urban freeholds, times have changed.  
 
One notable instance of state-induced gentrification has been at the Heygate Estate in 
London (Lees et al, 2013, Lees, 2014a; Lees and Ferreri, 2016). Here, in 2010, the Labour run 
Southwark Council sold the 25 acre Heygate estate, for £50 million to Australian developers, 
Lendlease. Although overage provisions - where payments may become payable by 
Lendlease to Southwark, once particular profit margins have been met - were reportedly 
included in the agreement, this is only for the sale of the units. The site, first by land transfer 
to Lendlease, then by sale to private owners or landlords, has moved from public to private, 
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and – for tenants - from social to private renting so that rent limits and extended security of 
tenure will no longer apply. The freedom of the Local Authority landlord to sell or 
regenerate as they see fit was illustrated by Southwark’s initial decision to sell the land on 
which the Aylesbury Estate (see Lees, 2014b). The council justified this by arguing that the 
decision arose from concerns about “commercial, legal and procurement risks” in using the 
Homes and Communities Agency’s Developer Panel (Dentons, 2010). Although it has not yet 
been sold, the language illustrates that this was – and remains - a choice for Southwark to 
make (and one upheld by central Government) as the freehold owner of land, rather than 
redeveloping the site themselves. 
 
These “regenerated” council housing estates have become sites of resistance, particularly 
when they are also sites of diversity (Lees, 2014a; Lees and Ferreri, 2016). Activists have 
recourse to public law remedies that are not available to private renters as the landlords are 
public bodies. Extra procedural requirements apply, including access to information under 
the Freedom of Information Act 2000 as well as the Environmental Information Regulations 
2004, which (broadly) apply to public authorities rather than private bodies. The greatest 
potential for resistance lies – perhaps ironically – in those residents on council estates who 
have either exercised their right to buy their property or have bought on from a previous 
council tenant who exercised their right to buy. For these residents, human rights (notably 
Article 8, the right to family life and Article 1, Protocol 1 of the 1950 European Convention 
of Human Rights) can be raised to require either procedural or substantive changes by 
landowners. As the redevelopment of the Heygate estate illustrates, even if individual 
estates cannot be saved, activism creates vital spaces for discussion.  
 
While often legal resistance does little more than delay the process, it can create discursive 
space to bring gentrification arguments out into the open. On the Aylesbury estate, for 
example, the decision to confirm the compulsory purchase of the long leaseholders and 
freeholders (under right to buy) was not confirmed by either the Inspector or the Secretary 
of State in 2016. Their justification for refusing the compulsory purchase order of the long 
leasehold properties included possible breaches of human rights, a failure to carry out an 
Equality Impact Assessment as well as the Public Sector Equality Duty (under section 149 of 
the Equality Act 2010). The decision found that particularly elderly and black and ethnic 
minority residents might find their cultural life "likely to be disproportionately affected" by 
the Compulsory purchase order and that this could lead to “dislocation from their cultural 
heritage for some residents” (paras 21 and 29, DCLG, 2016b). This decision was undoubtedly 
influenced by broader decisions, including that about the Heygate. 
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This refusal to confirm the compulsory purchase of the long leaseholders’ homes was a 
victory for Aylesbury activists (Lees, 2016 (Conversation)). It also followed more 
encouraging litigation in Shepherd’s Bush where a compulsory purchase order of a market 
was opposed by tenants (Horada v Sec of State, [2016] EWCA Civ 169). In creating discursive 
spaces, in delaying the processes, activist litigation can be felt to be having an effect. At the 
time of writing – early 2017 - a judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to confirm 
the compulsory purchase orders at the Aylesbury Estate, brought by Southwark, the local 
authority wanting to redevelop, is pending. When it is heard, the court can decide to uphold 
the Secretary of State’s refusal or, alternatively require the compulsory purchase order to 
be made. Litigation has brought delay to the developers and could act as an incentive for 
Southwark to negotiate a better deal with the remaining leaseholders. Despite the 
difficulties in bringing any public-interest litigation in England, often as a consequence of 
costs and the limited remit of judicial review, these interventions matter even if ultimately 
they cannot limit the rights of landowners to do as they wish with the land. They create 
discursive spaces. 
 
For while such legal activism is unlikely to stop some regeneration on these individual sites, 
the growing concern has led to governmental oversight and identification of “best practice” 
(as in the 2016 Estate Regeneration National Strategy) (DCLG, 2016c). Such initiatives could 
lead to other local authorities thinking long and hard about simple land transfer models, 
where they sell land to (potentially) the highest bidder. Activism – especially when it 
involves costly legal bills – can create discursive spaces for discussion (what moral right did 
the Labour leader of Southwark Council to strike the deal with Lendlease in respect of the 
Heygate?) as well as preventing some of the reproduction of building practices (which have 
been so evident in the retail context (Layard, 2010). Property practices – drawing on 
standard form contracts and assumptions about (confidential) commerciality - can be 
disrupted through such interruptions.  
 
The fight for English council estates is so important then, because being a resident on a 
publicly owned piece of land, brings expectations (and some - albeit limited - rights) in 
respect of consultation, equality and human rights. These rights only exist where the 
landowner is a public authority. This is true both for long leaseholders who have exercised 
their right to buy (as on the Aylesbury Estate) as for short leaseholders (in the Cressingham 
Garden litigation, where one case was won (R. (on the application of Bokrosova) v Lambeth 
LBC (2015) EWHC 3386) and one lost (Plant, R (on the application of) v Lambeth London 
Borough Council [2016] EWHC 3324 (Admin)). Public law objectives on consultation are (in 
the words of the Supreme Court) “to ensure not merely procedural fairness in the 
treatment of persons whose legally protected interests may be adversely affected, but also 
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to ensure public participation in the local authority's decision-making process” (R (on the 
application of Moseley v London Borough of Haringey, [2014] UKSC 56, para 38). These legal 
disputes are largely procedural as a consequence of the limitations of judicial review where 
courts cannot substitute their substantive judgment for that of the decision-makers. 
Nevertheless, the rights create discursive spaces for resistance and change, enabling 
discussion around gentrification to take place in ways that do not exist in private sector 
housing.  
 
New builds and affordable housing 
 
What then of new developments and new affordable housing? Could these be used to 
counter gentrification? Certainly, the construction of affordable housing – often a bulwark 
of resistance to gentrification– has fallen dramatically in 2016 to 32,100 homes in England. 
There has been a reduction of 52% from 2015/16, bringing us back to levels last seen in 
1991/1992 (DLCG, 2016d). This fall is despite an overall rise of 6% in house building 
completions this year, with 139,030 houses built (DCLG, 2016d) as well as an extraordinary 
release (mostly sale) of public land for housebuilding. One reason for this decline is that 84% 
of new housing is currently provided by the private sector (with 14% by housing associations 
and only 1% by local authorities, DCLG, 2016e). As in other jurisdictions (see Australia, for 
example, Davison et al, 2016) planning is a central process through which new affordable 
homes are created. Yet in England, while private developers can be made subject to s106 
obligations to provide affordable housing when granted planning permission, these are 
declining and even when they are built, are not necessarily affordable, given revised rules 
on what “affordable” means. For instance, over 12,000 affordable homes were built via 
s106 obligations in 2015-16, the vast majority (about 8,500) were for affordable rent (80% 
of market prices); affordable home ownership or shared ownership. Only around 3,000 units 
were built via s106 for social rent via in the entire country, even though  (DCLG, 2016d).  
 
One reason affordable homes are not being built is that while planning permission for new 
developments must still be obtained (under ss 55 and 57 of the TCPA 1990), and while this 
must be in accordance with the development plan (s 70(2) of the TCPA), there is a 
particularly controversial change in paragraph 14 of the National Planning Policy Framework 
(NPPF) (DCLG, 2012a). This introduces a presumption in favour of sustainable development 
as well as paragraphs 47 and 49, which use five-year supplies of housing as mechanisms to 
either decide in line with, or effectively override, the local plan (this is a matter of 
extraordinary legal controversy at the moment, awaiting the decision of the Supreme Court 
in the Hopkins Homes litigation). This extent of legal technicality here, highlights the irony 
that the NPPF was introduced to simplify and reduce red tape. It came about when the 
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government accepted the critique that “planning is the problem”, preventing the 
development of new homes (even though the Local Government Association identified 
475,000 homes in England which have been given planning permission but which are yet to 
be built (LGA, 2016)).  
 
Of course, we need more housing, and new developments can be welcome. However, the 
difficulty here, and the facilitation of gentrification, comes from the “dark art” of viability, 
which was also introduced in the 2012 NPPF. This requires that in order to “ensure viability, 
the costs of any requirements likely to be applied to development, such as requirements for 
affordable housing, standards, infrastructure contributions or other requirements should, 
when taking account of the normal cost of development and mitigation, provide 
competitive returns to a willing land owner and willing developer to enable the 
development to be deliverable” (NPPF, para 173). What this has meant in practice is that 
when developers apply for planning permission for a new housing development, they are 
now less likely to enter into a s106 agreement in order to obtain their planning consent. This 
is both facilitated (via the presumption in paragraph 14 of the NPPF) and undercut by 
viability. For rather than pay for or provide new affordable housing as their “planning 
obligation”, developers can, often by relying on consultant surveyors, argue that if 
affordable housing is required it will make the development “unviable”. The local authority 
often has little option but to grant planning permission even if no, or little, affordable 
housing is provided. 
 
Sometimes a local authority might argue vehemently against the developers’ calculations 
(which are often based on assumptions as to profitability). The cost of any planning appeal, 
or subsequent litigation, particularly at a time of severe local authority budget cuts in 
response to austerity politics, does, however, limit the space for dissent. And yet, there are 
some local authorities that are using the legal mechanisms at their disposal to resist. The 
London Borough of Islington has been particularly effective here. In its recent 
Supplementary Planning Document, Islington has set out its expectations on viability and 
appraisals, with a particular commitment to transparency, stating that: “The council 
considers that information submitted as a part of, and in support of a viability assessment 
should be treated transparently and be available for wider scrutiny. In submitting 
information, applicants do so in the knowledge that this will be made publically available 
alongside other application documents” (2016, 46). Alongside recent decisions assisting 
local authorities (including Greenwich RLBC v Information Commissioner, 2015 
EA/2014/0122), this marks an effort by progressive public actors to ensure that at the very 
least the information on which to assess viability and argue for more affordable housing is in 
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the public domain. These are occasional bright spots in the extraordinary facilitation of 
private sector development producing homes primarily at market prices. 
 
What all this means for gentrification is that new developments can be proposed, often 
regenerating mixed use, industrial or even former residential sites, but planning officers and 
local councillors can impose increasingly fewer requirements to provide affordable housing. 
Legal provisions on planning, particularly since the introduction of the 2012 NPPF, have 
facilitated regeneration and housebuilding. However, with no mechanisms in place to 
control rents or prices, poorer residents are often excluded. When this is coupled with limits 
on welfare payments, and the introduction of universal benefit, it can lead to widespread 
social reorganisation, largely through housing (Hamnett, 2014) and framings of “affordable 
rent”. Even Boris Johnson, then Mayor of London, argued in 2012 that this amounted to 
“social cleansing” (Lees, 2014a). Apparently neutral, technical provisions can have 
enormous social and spatial effects.  
 
What then can be done? Are there solutions that can be legally implemented other than a 
return to more progressive planning ways? The most effective way is to take a more robust 
approach to viability assessments – limiting profitability – perhaps through the standardised 
models that are now being proposed for London. The provision of affordable housing 
through planning obligations (s106 obligations) has declined rapidly as profitability (viability) 
has become central to decision-making in planning. This can be reformed as some local 
authorities – notably Islington in North London – are demonstrating (Islington, 2016). 
London, as a whole, is also investigating how to implement a standardised viability 
methodology to address these problems (Mayor for London, 2016). The 2017 Housing White 
Paper (2017a) is, however, notably silent on the need for a standardised viability 
methodology.  
  
Another way is to change what we require planning permission for, for example short-term 
lettings. In England planning rules have been “relaxed” to facilitate Airbnb despite the 
gentrification changes this can bring. Since the 2015 Deregulation Act, owners in London 
can rent their homes for up to 90 days, removing the requirement in the Greater London 
Council (General Powers) Act 1973 for planning permission if residential premises were to 
be used for temporary sleeping accommodation for less than 90 consecutive nights. While 
there are interventions by landlords, including London local authorities who remain the 
freeholders for flats purchased as “right to buy”, against tenants letting properties through 
Airbnb (for example, see Nemcova v Fairfield Rents Ltd [2016] UKUT 303), this relaxation in 
planning rules comes at exactly the same time as other cities, including Barcelona, Dublin 
and Berlin (Novy and Colomb, 2016, for Lisbon, see Gant 2016), have introduced regulations 
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to restrict short lets. In Dublin, for example, planning permission may now be required with 
Airbnb is recognised as a potentially commercial practice and a business use of space. 
Constraints on leases or within regulation can quite easily be introduced, should political 
actors desire them (Vice, 2016). So far, however, national decision-makers have facilitated 
Airbnb, leaving it to individual landlords to impose restraints if the properties are held on a 
lease. 
  
Another suggestion is to enrol materiality. This was illustrated early on in gentrification 
studies of the “break up” of houses into flats from the 1960s to 1980s in London (Hamnett 
and Randolph, 1986). If sub-division is possible, gentrification is materially facilitated. If it is 
not – as for example in some post-Soviet buildings – the physical and financial 
commodification are more difficult to combine to produce a change of ownership (whether 
freehold or leasehold). In these instances there are material restraints on gentrification. Of 
course, these can be overcome by large-scale regeneration projects. This is most evident in 
the destruction of council estates (including the Heygate and Aylesbury Estates in the 
Elephant and Castle in London) where the land values are so high that rent gap provides 
huge incentives for redevelopment (Lees, 2014a,b, Watt and Minton, 2016). In the 
regeneration of council housing estates an extraordinary amount of attention has been paid 
to the – apparently – poor design and quality of these estates. In England, materiality has 
often (for example, at both the Heygate and Aylesbury Estates) been enrolled to argue for 
gentrification, not against, it. Architects have been criticised for outdated, often 1960s 
designs, while a lack of property maintenance has led to undesirable living conditions 
(particularly once decanting processes have been undertaken and only a few leaseholders 
remain). This lack of care justifies “regeneration” with its physical, social and spatial 
consequences. 
 
Materiality can however be protected. This is illustrated by Berlin’s Milieuschutz, which uses 
legal restrictions to enrol material conditions as a mechanism to resist change (Karow-Kluge 
and Schmitt 2014, Holm, 2014). In Berlin, there is some anecdotal evidence that landlords 
are being refused permission to install marble ceilings, second bathrooms or lifts in five 
storey apartment blocks. Framed as restrictions on taste, these material restrictions, legally 
implemented, can inhibit building change and so inhibit their market value (for rent or sale), 
making them more affordable for existing residents. It is plausible that in England, too, 
conservation, listing or any planning measures might be used to inhibit gentrification. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there is widespread evidence that preservation of 
heritage was used as a pro-gentrification strategy, requiring particular maintenance 
procedures and costly permissions. Might there be scope to extend listing beyond 
historically significant sites and aesthetically pleasing fabrics to “landmark” or protect 
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authentic places as conservation areas today? We know that design is crucial in attracting 
wealthier residents – and gentrification – whether as a result of conservation restrictions or 
apartments produced for wealthy international buyers. Material conditions might constitute 
part of a “right to community” if this can be developed from the decision letter refusing to 
confirm the compulsory purchase orders on the Aylesbury Estate in 2016. In particular, 
there is potential here for minority narratives (given equality duties) to find protective legal 
form (as the Pueblito Paisa dispute, discussed below, illustrates).  
 
One further planning initiative may also offer further hope. Throughout areas of outstanding 
beauty, including rural and coastal areas, “locals” are being priced out by incomers, notably 
second homeowners who rarely use properties throughout the year. The effect has been 
that in Cornwall, the Yorkshire Dales and the Lake District, for example, coastal and rural 
locations have seen such house price inflation that residents without rental security or 
children of longstanding residents can no longer afford to own or rent locally. One local 
response has been to attempt to introduce planning rules that limit the construction of new 
properties that can be used as second homes. Instead houses are given planning permission 
only if they are to be used as primary residences (with provision within enforcement made 
for exceptional circumstances). Long desired, these changes have come through 
neighbourhood planning initiatives (introduced alongside the Localism Act of 2011). They 
have also been (in the case of St Ives, in Cornwall) been upheld in court in R (RLT Built 
Environment Ltd) v. Cornwall Council [2016] EWHC 2817 (Admin)).  
 
Neighbourhood planning might then be an ally in resisting gentrification. Certainly, minority 
perspectives have not always been incorporated in neighbourhood planning and some see 
the process as backward-looking and nostalgic, raising questions about the “attempts to 
mobilize the affective and morally charged language of the local” (Tait and Inch 2016, 174). 
However, there is a localism of hope that engages with differentiated civic capacities within 
and between communities. Wills (2016, 4) has argued persuasively for optimism, noting the 
difficulties and yet suggesting that as “the shift towards localist statecraft exposes the limits 
of our dominant paradigms for thinking about politics and its geography, as well as the 
weakness of our institutional infrastructure, there is an opportunity to revisit questions 
about the importance of place”. Neighbourhood planning could be use progressively to plan 
for stable and sustainable communities, that indeed are the aims of many participants.  
 
Legal mechanisms might then be developed to try to protect distinctive places (a further 
example might be the terroirs that are used as geographic indications to protect food 
producers, including champagne and prosciutto di Parma (Raustiala and Munzer, 2007). We 
might imagine ways - by drawing maps and attaching protections as both neighbourhood 
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planning and geographic indications do – to protect cultural patterns of consumption or 
local practices as efforts to inhibit gentrification. We could investigate the potential of using 
provisions analogous to these on second homes to inhibit “buy to leave” of new build 
residential properties in high value urban areas (or even second homes in the City of 
London, the authority with by far the highest proportion in England (at 28.5%, compared 
with Cornwall’s 5.4% (Estate Agent Today, 2016). Strikingly, there are no nationally 
complied figures and – as with “buy to leave” – researchers are heavily reliant on estate 
agents for information). It might – as with AirBnB regulation in Berlin, Barcelona and New 
York – involve some neighbourly investigation for enforcement. There may or may not be 
some distaste for that. As a legal mechanism, however, as these cities have demonstrated, 
such provisions can be drafted.  
 
Of course, this is not straightforward. Tastes and practices change. Identifying “locals” in 
restrictive ways (were your parents or your grandparents born here?) is exclusionary. There 
is a tension within gentrification studies between place and networks (including of 
immigration and globalisation). At the outset Glass (1964) acknowledged this, writing that 
London is “too vast, too complex, too contrary and too moody to become entirely familiar” 
(133). We might, however, think about how to develop such ideas to create legal 
mechanisms to protect place and existing residents. Or we might adopt everyday acts of 
resistance from Cornish locals who (allegedly) might put a mackerel through the letterbox of 
a rarely used second home.  
 
(2) Commercial Property  
 
Some of the most noted signs, or signifiers, of gentrification, are the emergence of hipster 
bars, artisanal pizza restaurants and estate agents in established – but not necessarily 
financially thriving – shopping streets. Zukin (2011) has argued that we need to 
acknowledge “the entrepreneurial role of newcomers who open businesses in the district - 
art galleries, performance spaces, restaurants, boutiques, and bars - that not only provide 
spaces of consumption for residents and visitors to develop a lifestyle, but also provide 
visible opportunities for neighbourhoods to develop a new place identity” (163). Such claims 
about place identity are not uncontroversial (Slater, 2006) but are facilitated by two legal 
mechanisms: (1) the construction of commercial leases; and (2) the grant of planning 
permissions and other licences for change of use. Current rules facilitate change – and so 
allow gentrification – while new rules might be envisaged to restrict change, better enabling 
existing retailers and businesses to stay put. While both leases and planning are crucial in 
commercial gentrification practices, for reasons of space, only leases will be considered 
here. For it is once again the lack of security of tenure and the decision-making power that 
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so often remains with the freeholder that becomes the facilitator of change. This chapter 
will now review how leases operate to facilitate gentrification, contributing to growing 
debates on retail gentrification, which – as Hubbard (2017, 2) notes – “remains poorly 
theorized as a form of gentrification”. 
 
As a device to enable land ownership and use, leases have been used for hundreds of years, 
particularly as a mechanism to facilitate mortgage lending and in agricultural contexts, as 
already discussed, and these will be the focus of this section. For in the English commercial 
context, long leases are often used for major redevelopment, combined with public leasing 
of land, including 999 year leases for the construction of the Royal Albert Hall (Kelsey, 2001) 
as well as for Liverpool Football Club at Anfield in 2006. Long leases for 250 years are also 
common in retail-led regeneration (Layard, 2010). Such very long leases are close to 
freehold in respect of term (who knows what a site will look like 250 or 999 years from 
today?) and the agreements of the lease, even when the freeholder is a public body, are 
generally confidential. These long leases give extraordinary stability to developers, be they 
for commercial or philanthropic reasons. 
Elsewhere, however, the average length of commercial leases is between 6 and 7 years 
(BPF, 2015). Start-ups, in particular, will often only be offered a short lease or indeed they 
may choose one, particularly if the agreement does not have a break clause (giving either 
the tenant or landlord the ability to serve notice during the term of the lease). While shorter 
leases give businesses greater flexibility – if the business does not flourish, they will not be 
contractually obligated to pay rent for a long period – it also means that the rent can be 
increased more quickly when a new lease is negotiated at the end of the term.  
This matters for gentrification since, while a freehold owner can use their property as they 
wish for as long as they wish, a leaseholder cannot. The ability to end a lease at the end of a 
fixed term (termination) or to vary its conditions (particularly, how much rent is payable) are 
part of the contractual relationship between landlord and tenant. At the end of the lease 
any increase in value – with any improvements made by the tenant, to the land, the 
property or the neighbourhood – accrue to the landlord. And while a lease is an estate, and 
so something to be owned within property law, it is also a contract, with terms to be 
negotiated. Although such negotiations must take place in the shadow of the law, 
historically the law of England and Wales has largely left the parties free to negotiate the 
initial form of a commercial lease.  
 
The most contentious aspect of commercial leases has been the amount of rent payable. In 
England there are no restrictions and market forces determine the level. An initial rent will 
be agreed between landlord and tenant when a lease is first negotiated. The tenancy 
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agreement may provide for rent increases or reviews during the term, but if it does not, the 
initial rent will normally apply for the full length of the tenancy. Rent review clauses can be 
inserted into commercial leases to provide a mechanism through which the landlord and 
tenants can agree rises in rent over the course of the tenancy. In times of recession there 
has been considerable concern about the use of “upwards only” rent review clauses, so that 
even if the value of the capital property goes down, the rent is still required to go up. This 
matters because if the parties cannot agree a new rent under a rent review clause, costly 
arbitration or expert valuation procedures are used to resolve the disagreement. Mary 
Portas has been especially critical, recommending alternative lease structures for smaller 
businesses, in particular, including a turnover based rent, which gives “landlords a stake in 
the success of the tenant’s business” (Portas, 2011, 35). 
 
This lack of restrictions on rent mean that security of tenure for commercial tenants is 
limited. For while the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 confers a statutory right of renewal on 
occupying business tenants (s24), a landlord can still seek the end of the lease (s25) if s/he 
can make out either disrepair, persistent delay in rent, breach of other obligation, offer of 
alternative accommodation, premises substantially more valuable as a whole, demolition or 
reconstruction or landlord’s own occupation (s30). More significantly still, the 1954 Act does 
not provide for any degree of rent regulation. Even if a tenant can renew his lease, “the rent 
is to be that which the holding might reasonably be expected to be let in the open market 
by a willing lessor and lessee, disregarding the effect of the occupation of the tenant, any 
goodwill of the business and certain tenant's improvements” (s34). 
 
The effects of these provisions are vividly demonstrated by the experience of the Kaff Bar in 
Brixton in London, a thriving local business. As Steven Ross, manager of the Kaff Bar 
explains, after being served with a s25 notice not to renew their short-term lease on the 
basis of alleged landlord’s own occupation: “we finally received some proper dialogue from 
the other side.  This was to now offer us a renewal on our lease. We expected a rise in the 
rent and were prepared, but not for over treble the amount we are currently paying!!! As 
you can imagine, we weren’t best pleased with this so we have tried to challenge this since 
and tried to arrange a meeting to discuss terms of negotiation. However, with recent events 
and news about other properties and the future of Brixton in general I sat down and 
proceeded to do the sums to see if realistically we could stay.  The short answer again is, 
no!” (quoted in Urban, 2015). The use of these legal provisions, and the decisions of the 
landlord (the freeholder), led to the end of this popular Brixton bar. 
In gentrifying neighbourhoods, a lack of security of tenure coupled with rents pinned to the 
open market facilitates change. It produces steep rent hikes with no protection for existing 
tenants when their lease term expires or the landlord decides to evict under the terms of 
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the lease. This is as true in Shoreditch in London as in Harlem in New York City. The tenant 
may well have put in effort to bring about positive transformations yet they will not share in 
the benefits at the end of any lease. For, as Adam Smith’s quotation at the start of this 
chapter makes clear, it is the freeholder – the landlord – who benefits in increases in value 
in the land. And so in 2016, Dip & Flip, selling “gourmet burgers and hot meat sandwiches 
topped with gravy in a simple-yet-stylish dining room” opened up in the Kaff Bar’s old site, 
presumably (because these facts are commercially confidential) paying a higher rent.  
 
How could we reform the law on commercial leases to inhibit gentrification? The Kaff Bar’s 
story is one that is told over and again in gentrifying neighbourhoods. Local shops and 
businesses are displaced, replaced with new users, be they commercial or residential, 
producing higher profits to landlords (either in rents or, if the landlord “cashes in” on rising 
land values, in capital receipts). While residential rent control is regularly discussed, 
commercial rent control is much less common. It was briefly introduced in Albany, New York 
in 1948, existed in New York City (with measures for decontrol) from 1945-1963 and most 
comprehensively was introduced in Elmwood in Berkeley, California in 1982, providing 
commercial rent stabilisation for a small shopping district of eighty-four stores (Keating, 
1985). Zukin identifies the expiry of “rent-control-type laws” as one reason for the rise of 
“loft living” in New York City after the 1960s (1989, 52).  
In England, however, there are no calls for commercial rent control. The 1954 Act gives 
security of tenure but no guarantees as to rent. In the absence of any prospective changes 
to commercial leases, another alternative is to work with landlords for positive change. 
Alive to the difficulties, the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors has developed a 
specimen lease for five years with no rent review (RICS, 2016). There is a lease code, setting 
out desirable provisions from the government’s point of view, which landlords may follow. 
Very little of this has been legally transcribed and leases remain instruments that reflect the 
power dynamics (or market conditions, if you prefer) between landlord and tenant. 
Freeholders may often be non-resident. “Shell” companies are created to be the freehold 
owners of land, sometimes registered abroad for tax-reasons, making it difficult for 
individual tenants to deal with landlords directly, engaging instead with managing agents. 
Again there is a role here for “ethical landlordism”, in the use of meanwhile leases, another 
legal mechanism to facilitate change. Lauded in DCLG’s 2009 Report Looking After Our Town 
Centres and widely heralded as productive for high streets, entrepreneurs and charities as 
well as for landlords (minimising the payment of business rates and utilities while properties 
are empty, having the security of active occupation and showcasing possible future use) 
meanwhile leases are short-term by design. They facilitate (productive) change. Yet while 
the recent governments have worked collaboratively to develop guidance and a specimen 
 20 
lease for pop up shops (DCLG, 2012b), in practice, landlords require legal arrangements to 
be overseen and checked by a solicitor and/or surveyor (if alterations are to be made) of the 
landlords’ choice and at the pop up tenants’ cost. Although charities are advantaged here, 
as they can occupy otherwise empty premises and claim rate relief (they pay only 20%) 
often in exchange for "tax-deductible donations" from landlords, for non-charitable 
entrepreneurs, turnover can be fast, with the costs almost always borne primarily by the 
tenant.  
Encouraging philanthropic commercial landlordism for meanwhile or standard commercial 
leases might then be an avenue for productive resistance to gentrification whilst still 
facilitating change. If we can do little to change the law, we can change legal and 
commercial practice. Examples of good practice using leases without transferring the 
freehold for community benefit abound (CABE, 2008, 2010, DCLG 2012b). Such 
developments can be perceived as gentrification but if sensitively implemented, they can 
provide genuine local benefits. However, in recent years, the impacts of austerity politics 
and the perceived need for local authorities to sell “spare” sites to balance their books, 
coupled with a growing emphasis on using public land “efficiently” (HM Treasury, 2013), has 
reduced opportunities for meaningful, community-led engagement with local authority 
landowners who often engaged productively in these schemes. We may need to look to 
greater community and private philanthropic landlordism in future, changing cultures rather 
than legal provisions, if we are to create brakes to slow down the constant change and rent 
increases facilitated by commercial leases. That of course requires access to land, which is of 
course becoming ever more expensive. 
One last way in which legal rules on commercial property can facilitate gentrification is to 
note both the legal reproduction (the same agreements and the same legal mechanisms) 
are accompanied by materials and designs, which are also reproduced from site to site. As 
Anna Minton has noted: “Take the Westfield shopping centre in Stratford City – you don’t 
even need to know you’re in Stratford. You’ve come by tube or you’ve come straight in on 
the motorway, which has taken you into the car park. You can go shopping. But if you make 
the effort to look across the road from the top of the entrance staircase, and you look down 
over the gyratory system, you’ve got this run-down 1970s mall, which is where local people 
go” (quoted in Imrie and Lees, 2014, 35).  
 
Gentrification is a profoundly material practice. Where once it consisted of the introduction 
of “a cultural sensibility and refinement that transcended the post-war suburban ethos of 
conformity and kitsch” (Zukin, 1993, 192) or quiche lorraines and Habitat furniture (Moran, 
2007), it now takes physical form through architectural practices, using repeated 
consignments of materials. There is an emphasis on “authenticity” (for microbreweries or 
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local bread, see Hubbard 2017) as well as large scale reproduction of new shopping centres 
that are materially reproduced with very little connection to place (for examples, see 
Hammersons 2016 Annual Report, with centres in England, expanding into France and Spain 
as well). Both the reproduced and the “authentic” can be understood as gentrification. 
Similarly, as Smith and Williams (2013) note, the residential and the commercial are 
frequently interlinked in major construction projects, in the redevelopment of urban 
waterfronts for example, industrial rezoning or the rise of hotel, office or retail districts. 
These large projects could incorporate cultural and place-based planning restraints within 
the redevelopments but generally do not. 
 
Such cultural and material choices are profoundly positional. With individual (though 
networked), early, gentrifiers these choices were noticeable but had little legal force. This 
became quite different when urban and historic conservation initiatives began to focus on 
the fabric of buildings and their curtilages. Conservation areas were introduced in 1967, 
with early gentrifiers often using their mechanisms to inhibit change or require costly 
renovation practices (Lees et al, 2008). These days, conservation areas are designated areas 
of special architectural or historic interest “the character or appearance of which it is 
desirable to preserve or enhance” (ss 69(1) and (2) of the Planning (Listed Buildings and 
Conservation Areas) Act 1990). The regulatory provisions can see off change, particularly in 
terms of the built fabric of a place. Yet they are invariably focused on historical artefacts and 
sites and reflect the conservation preferences of majority cultures. 
 
This is also true of listed buildings. This began in England, post-war, in 1947 building on the 
Victorians’ 1882 Ancient Monuments Protection Act. The system acknowledged a focus on 
the historic built environment and today buildings can be listed, and so protected, if they 
have architectural or historic interest that is longstanding (today these criteria are in s1(3) of 
the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990). If buildings are not 
aesthetically pleasing, they might still be listed, but only if they are “important for reasons 
of technological innovation, or as illustrating particular aspects of social or economic 
history” (DCMS, 2010, 4) not because of their use today. As this illustrates, interpretations 
of which cultures we should protect and admire are inevitably subjective, privileging one set 
of cultural practices and preferences over those of others. Shaw is explicit about this, in 
writing of Sydney, that: “as desires for heritage develop and consolidate with gentrification, 
and become more inclusive of difference, migrant and indigenous heritages continue to 
remain outside the heritage orbit” (2005, 59). 
 
The difficulties in protecting minority heritage has been achingly clear in the battle to 
maintain Pueblito Paisa, an indoor market in Seven Sisters in London (at Wards Corner). This 
 22 
provides a spatial and social focus for Latin American cultures in its shops, cafes, 
restaurants, and barbers shops, on a site where 64% of the 36 units are occupied by traders 
either from Latin America or who are Spanish speaking. Earmarked as part of a major 
regeneration project, Haringey Borough Council granted planning permission for the 
demolition of existing buildings and erection of mixed-use developments instead. Initially 
protestors were able to succeed in their claim that the council had infringed the Race 
Relations Act 1976 (as amended) in failing to pay due regard to the need to "promote 
equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups" as 
required by section 71. This finding was even upheld by the Court of Appeal (R (on the 
application of Janet Harris) v London Borough of Haringey [2010] EWCA Civ 70).  
 
Nevertheless, at Pueblito Paisa, once the procedural steps had been observed, the plans for 
the proposed regeneration continued. These included a compulsory purchase order to 
assemble the land for the project, which was submitted to the Secretary of State (who 
needs to approve it) in September 2016. At the time of writing – in early 2017 – the battle at 
Pueblito Paisa continues, but the legal mechanisms to facilitate change (including the 
compulsory purchase of leases as well as planning) are well underway. They have, however, 




This chapter has argued that legal mechanisms and practices facilitate – and can be used to 
resist – the changes that lie at the heart of gentrification. It is the first step in a larger 
project that must be collaborative (see Lees, Shin and Lopez-Morales, 2016, on international 
collaboration in gentrification studies), to collate the legal provisions and practices that are 
used to facilitate and resist gentrification around the world. Within gentrification studies we 
often focus on the same questions: unaffordable housing, retail conglomerates, 
internationally focused developers, minority cultural preservation or Airbnb. Comparative 
legal solutions, collected with sufficient detail, can provide a valuable resource to show 
sympathetic public officials, be they (Shadow) Secretaries of State, Mayors or councillors, 
that legal changes can be crafted to effect resistance, to limit change and strengthen rights 
to stay put.  These might include voluntary rent controls, planning restrictions whether on 
viability, and transparency or neighbourhood restrictions on secondary residences. Reforms 
might include material restrictions (akin to Berlin’s Milieuschutz) or a concerted effort to 
keep land ownership in public or communal hands wherever possible (for example, Rock 
House above).   
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There are significant constitutional differences. Legally, London cannot, for example, 
regulate its housing or land use rules in the way that Berlin, New York or Barcelona can. 
England is a country where land use is primarily regulated at the national scale (increasingly 
presuming or automatically granting permission and so giving the decision-making power to 
individual developers instead). There is nothing in this chapter about Wales, let along 
Scotland or Northern Ireland. Devolution has profound legal and practical effects. However, 
localised practices can change, particularly if arguments can be made that (for example) 
residential or commercial rent control or planning restrictions have facilitated “authenticity” 
in highly regarded cities elsewhere. 
 
Being alive to legal differences matters if we are to seek solutions. We need to acknowledge 
the possibilities and some apparent limits of change. Even in Vancouver, with a Mayor 
deeply concerned with housing affordability and displacement, the introduction of a 15% 
tax on non-national property purchases is now subject to the approval of British Columbia 
Supreme Court, which will rule on a class-action suit from prospective foreign buyers. And 
yet, if we know where the legal difficulties lie, we can investigate whether there are soft 
spots, where can we challenge, what can we push? This is one purpose of legal work in 
gentrification studies.  
 
Another key focus for legally-aware comparative gentrification research is to identify land 
ownership. As this chapter has illustrated, the landowner, either the freeholder or a (very) 
long leaseholder, has extraordinary power to set the agenda for their land and determine 
the look, feel, taste and smell of a city. In England, within the private sector, landowners can 
then sell or rent land to the highest bidder and even when land is publicly owned (for 
example by a local authority) the rules on land ownership, or how to buy and sell or rent, 
remain broadly same as for private owners (though there are human rights implications, 
some public law rules and possible requirements to consult) (Layard, 2016). More 
importantly, even though public landowners can act very quickly in redeveloping or 
gentrifying sites, procedural remedies can create space for discursive arguments about how 
public landowners should behave, drawing on histories and practices that are often site-
specific. Public landowners are not necessarily more philanthropic or socially minded – as 
activists throughout London know well – but they can be open to debates about equality 
and access. It is this scope for different property practices that can be identified and 
developed through legal and political activism but first we need to keep asking: “who owns 
the land?” Can we see any contracts? Concepts of property and contract, public and private, 
emerge throughout international practices of regeneration, often replicated even if they are 
almost always jurisdictionally distinctive.  
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To continue to internationalise gentrification studies then, we must consider the legal. 
Jurisdictions differ but broad concepts – freeholds, leases, human rights, participation rights 
and forms of judicial review – are similar. The details matter: a German lease with security 
of tenure and regulated rents is a very different creature from an English assured shorthold 
tenancy. To identify how legal mechanisms and practices are facilitating – and can resist – 
gentrification, scholars need to engage in the details of legal research.  
 
Analysts of global gentrification studies have noted the “trajectory” of gentrification beyond 
the usual suspects of “London, New York etc.” (Lees, Shin and Lopez-Morales, 2016). There 
will be many reasons for the extension of gentrification practices (economic, political, 
cultural), yet the mechanisms used will often be similar. The use of the lease – particularly 
when there is no or limited rent regulation or security of tenure – is a key instrument in 
facilitating gentrification. Planning permission may be required for new development or 
change of use but if regulations do not impose requirements for affordable housing or 
retail, the planning system may facilitate – rather than prevent – gentrification. There is 
growing evidence that Anglo-American conceptual hegemony is being used – in primarily 
capitalist land use decisions – to produce gentrification across the globe (Lees, Shin, Lopez-
Morales, 2016) This chapter suggests that these shared concepts and practices are often 
legal – freeholds, leases and licences as well as planning permissions – facilitate the 
replication of gentrification. The relative ease with which this can occur is illustrated by 
public sector projects, often in the name of regeneration (for example, as discussed here on 
the Heygate and Aylesbury housing estates). As this chapter has discussed, there are only 
limited procedural legal safeguards. Conversely, however, while private sector developers 
may operate more slowly they are under far less public scrutiny and can enrol greater claims 
(both legal as well as rhetorical) of commercial confidentiality.  
Asking legal questions is crucial to understand how gentrification happens wherever it is 
taking place. It is so often the same legal mechanisms – leases, licences, planning 
permissions – as well as key legal absences – rent regulation, security of tenure or 
compulsory financial contributions to communities – that facilitate gentrification. Western 
concepts of property and land use have travelled extraordinarily well (Davies, 2007). As 
comparative gentrification studies illustrate, there are different ways of doing property and 
regeneration (including ethical landlordism, rent controls, security of tenure, state-led 
construction of affordable housing, community public spaces, social retail ventures, to name 
just a few) and we need to identify and publicise these. Roy has called for “a more 
contoured knowledge” of cities (Roy, 2009) and this applies to legal knowledge as well. We 
can – and should – look for legal concepts that act as alternatives to the standard Western 
incidents of property and planning practices to inform calls for change. As Lees, Shin and 
Lopez-Morales (2016, 226) argue: “We need to unpick ‘the planet’s gentrified mind’, we 
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need to be counter-cultural again, to find radical ways and insights, to operate outside social 
assumptions, to generate social and urban change through contestation and the 
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